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 Money, credit and capital are three fundamental economic terms that every high school 
student, at least, should understand. Yet we live in a society that does not treasure clarity about 
itself. Power prefers obscurity. So not only do few high school students understand these con-
cepts, but few PhDs in economics do either. If you learn anything from this article, at least I hope 
you will understand these three. If you already know, or think you do, what money, credit and 
capital are (readers of this journal should know these), perhaps nonetheless you will be some-
what surprised by the simplicity, clarity and power of my treatment of these basic concepts. Most 
importantly, understanding these better makes it much easier to understand why economic crises 
occur. These are not primarily caused by errors in government policy, but by the process of capi-
talist competition between bears and bulls, involving the conflicting interests of creditors and 
debtors. Strategic power in a capitalist economy rests with those who advance and withdraw 
credit at the highest levels.1 
Today there is persistent focus in the public media about only a few topics regarding the 
economy. Among these are the ever changing values of stocks and certain stock market indices 
(rather like sports scores), and the other is the activities of central banks like the U.S. Federal Re-
serve System (Fed) and its alleged control of the money supply. If you have taken courses in eco-
nomics, you have certainly imbibed the myth of the money supply, but even if you only listen to 
economic or business news, you have encountered it nearly every day. The myth of the money 
supply is one of the foundational myths of our society, essential for obscuring the key relations 
of power. Once you understand why it is a myth, you tear back the veil obscuring one of the 
most potent powers in our society: credit power. 
The myth of the money supply has three elements: (1) money is a stock of something in 
limited supply, i.e., it is scarce; (2) the supply of money, and therefore its value, is regulated by 
the government through the agency of its central bank; and (3) money is the means of payment 
for all the transactions in the society that collectively constitute the gross domestic product or 
GDP. Generally you will not find these three listed exactly the way I have listed them in money 
and banking textbooks, but this is certainly consistent with what they all teach. Unfortunately, all 
three are false. Even many people who are critics of capitalism may be surprised to learn how 
many of its myths they have internalized. 
When I refer to textbook economics I refer to a tradition that starts in 1948 with the fa-
mous Nobel-prize winning MIT economist Paul Samuelson.2 His textbook pioneered the organi-
zation of topics, diagrams and concepts that are standard in all mainstream introductory text-
books ever since. Not only that, but innovation now is difficult, because the College Board’s 
standardized Advanced Placement exam fixes the curriculum that must be taught in an introduc-
tory class. If students study these topics further they will take a course in money and banking, 
which also adheres to the myth of the money supply discussed here. It is rarely possible to learn 
much about the real financial system in an undergraduate economics education. Most graduate 
students just learn the same topics at a more mathematically rigorous level, so they rarely learn 
                                                 
1 More detailed elaboration and historical examples may be found in my book, Nolt (2015) and my weekly blog at 
www.worldpolicy.org/polarizing-political-economy. Also useful on financialization and crisis is Turner (2015). 
2 I own two editions of Samuelson (1951) and Samuelson (1973). The second of these was the textbook used in my 
first economics course. I have taught introductory economics and money and banking using recent but similar texts. 
 much about the real financial system either, with the exception of a few unusual graduate pro-
grams, including (in the U.S) the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (where I earned my 
MA in economics), the University of Missouri at Kansas City, and the New School University 
(where I taught, though in the political science department, not economics). What I criticize as 
the myth of the money supply is the dogma of a mainstream economics education. 
Beyond the mainstream there is little systematic economic thinking that penetrates be-
yond the circles of a few academic specialists. Perhaps the most well-known critic of mainstream 
views is post-Keynesian Hyman Minsky, who has also been influential in some Left circles. 
Minsky’s treatment of money and credit is an improvement over the neoclassicals, but still far 
from being adequate because he inherits too much of the conceptual baggage of the mainstream 
economists, including their confusing use of the term “money” rather than the clearer and more 
definitive term “credit.” For example, Minsky confusingly refers to the bill market (discussed be-
low) as the “money market” (common business argot), although economists do not count bills as 
money. He treats the mainstream definitions of money skeptically, but without definitively re-
placing them with a thorough and strategic analysis of credit. 
The main problem with Minsky’s approach to credit is that he outlines some of the rea-
sons for bullishness, but neglects bearish interests. His classification of finance into hedge, spec-
ulative or Ponzi based on the increasing burden of debt service relative to current cash flow is 
not a very helpful distinction. Most sober productive long-term capital investments would be 
classified by his pejorative term “Ponzi finance” during their early years using his schema, 
whereas the most extremely leveraged bulls might look like hedge finance during boom times 
when they are yielding income higher than the cost of borrowing. What creates vulnerability is 
not the current flows, but the debt overhang in relation to the cost and broader market impact of 
unwinding leveraged positions in a crisis. Yet my main point here is not a systematic criticism of 
Minsky, but rather challenging the neoclassical approach that dominates the textbooks and main-
stream economics education. 
 
What is money? 
 
We all think we know what money is. We use it every day. But try asking people to de-
fine money and how it is created. Few people have a clue. But they will still venture confused 
and inconsistent guesses. Those who have studied quite a bit of economics are no less confused 
than the rest, but they may have more confidence that their confusions are correct.  
Economists define money in two distinct ways, which is already a clue that something is 
wrong. On the one hand, they use a functionalist definition of money as a singular substance with 
three functions: society’s means of payment, a store of value, and the universal metric of value. 
Actually, only the last of these is a function unique to money. Credit has for centuries been the 
main means of payment in societies. Economics largely ignores its vital role. A multitude of as-
sets serves as stores of value, so money is by no means unique in this regard. Each monetary re-
gion, usually coincident with a nation, does have an official currency that is the principle metric 
of value in that society. Unfortunately, unlike other metrics such as the meter and kilogram, the 
 value of the money unit, say one U.S. dollar, is itself always changing. This was always true, in-
cluding under the gold standard. So although money is our universal measure of value, it is per-
petually inconstant. 
On the other hand, economists, when measuring the quantity of money, the money sup-
ply, give a different class of definitions. They define money as a measurable stock of something 
that performs the three functions listed above. It is a scarce stock of something, they are very def-
inite about that. But when it comes to measuring that stock, they give a confusing and obviously 
arbitrary plethora of definitions including M1, M2, M3, M4, etc. In lovely regularity, these are 
conveniently ranked. 
But you should immediately ask yourself, which of these is the quantity of stuff that per-
forms the three functions of money? The correct answer is “all of the above, and more, but not 
exclusively” though few economists would dare ask this question on an exam for fear you might 
start to realize there are skeletons in the closet. If money is some definite and fixed quality of 
something truly fundamental to the economy, surely it should be measurable in some consistent 
way. But it is not. All the measures of money are equally arbitrary, though the one most consist-
ently used and probably meant when you read about what is happening to the “money supply” is 
M1. Yet M1 is no less arbitrary for being the most commonly used by economists and central 
banks. Certainly few ordinary people know the definition of M1 or refer to specifically that when 
they talk about money. 
Let’s start to resolve the inconsistencies and to arrive at a better definition of money. 
Summarizing so far, economists consider money to be both the universal measure of value 
(which indeed it has become) and a definite stock of something that can be measured in units of 
itself. These two are obviously two different things. Meters, degrees centigrade and kilograms 
are units of measure, but it is nonsensical to ask “how many meters are there in the world to-
day?” The U.S. dollar is a unit of measuring value (though, unlike the meter, the dollar varies in 
value over time), but economists do ask, “What is the current stock of dollars?” They may in-
form you that “the money supply” has increased 5 percent. It should be obvious (though econo-
mists make sure it is not) that money as a unit of measure is not the same thing as the supply of 
something we can measure in money units. 
Currency is one thing everybody, ordinary people and economists alike, agree is money. 
Currency includes coins (once of significant metallic value, but now mere tokens) and paper 
money. Economists make one small modification in defining as part of the money supply only 
that portion of the total stock of currency that is in the hands of the public and not in the central 
bank’s vaults. In other words, the money supply falls when currency returns to the central bank. 
You might wonder which of the M# definitions of the money supply represents circulating cur-
rency. In fact, currency is included in all of them but is typically a minority of all of them. That 
is, all definitions of money supply that economists use include much that is not currency. 
Most of what the M# definitions include other than currency is the current balances in 
various categories of bank accounts and even financial instruments. This is indeed where the 
economists’ definitions of “the” money supply become quite arbitrary and varied. Few econo-
mists today are self-conscious about the theory behind this plethora of definitions. They just take 
these as given. Generally there are two things that distinguish higher from lower M#: the higher 
the rank the more illiquid and the more likely that the money in question is used primarily by 
 corporations, investors and the rich rather than ordinary folk. Economists are generally aware of 
the first criteria but less so the second. This second distinction is best seen in the difference be-
tween M2 and M3. M2 includes small denomination savings accounts, but not large ones. 
Clearly, small accounts are no more liquid than larger ones of the same type. Similarly, broker-
age accounts (where by the way nearly all of my liquid wealth resides) are counted in M3 rather 
than M2 even though they are in fact more liquid than small denomination time deposit accounts 
that are in M2. So clearly, liquidity is not the sole criteria for ranking types of money, though 
economists sometimes claim that it is. 
The reason rich people’s money counts less as money than that of ordinary folk derives 
from the myth of the money supply, specifically, point 3 above, the idea that money is the means 
of payment for all the transactions in the society that collectively constitute the gross domestic 
product or GDP. Rich people may more likely use their forms of money for something other than 
buying GDP, e.g., for buying assets, financial and real. Thus the forms of money most readily 
used by the rich and powerful institutions that dominate the stratosphere of the credit system are 
made to seem less potent, disappearing into the indistinct clouds of ever higher M#. In fact, these 
forms of money are even more concentrated and potent, but in strategic ways discussed in the fi-
nal section of this paper. 
The myth of the money supply is implicit in the first textbook equation about money: 
 
M x V = P x Y 
 
Where M = the stock of money (whether M1, M2, or whatever), V = the velocity of that particu-
lar stock, or the number of times per year the stock turns over, P = the price level (measured by a 
price index), and Y = national income as measured by GDP. In fact, only three of these four are 
actually measured directly (if imprecisely), whereas V is just a residual number that solves the 
equation and is presumed to be meaningful. This formula is often called the fundamental mone-
tary equation. 
The story told in textbooks and introductory economics classes is that this equation is 
meaningful because, supposedly, the stock of money, M, is the means of payment for the GDP, 
that is, newly produced final goods and services. Therefore, if M increases but production does 
not or cannot immediately increase, the equation cannot balance unless the price level increases. 
Hence the most common conclusion from this mythic artifact is the monetarist argument that if 
the money supply increases faster than the rate of GDP growth, inflation will result. Keynesians 
counter that sometimes increasing the money supply actually increases the GDP without causing 
inflation, especially if the economy is plagued with unemployment and idle productive capacity, 
as is most evident during every downturn. 
Every aspect of this story is problematic. First of all, money, however defined, is not the 
principal means of payment for the GDP, and second, money is also used for purposes other than 
means of payment for GDP, which economists will sometimes admit, but then ignore when it 
comes to formulating monetary theories. The principal means of payment throughout history has 
been credit. Credit predates money. The function of merchant capital has always been to con-
serve money and leverage profits using credit. The second point, that money is used for purposes 
other than payment for GDP, connects with my point above about why economists treat higher 
 M# as less money-like than M1. Rich people’s money fades into the clouds of indistinct myth. 
The weakest forms of money, dispersed among consumers, are highlighted whereas the most po-
tent and concentrated forms are more often ignored. 
There are three main uses for money that are obscured by the formula M x V = P x Y. 
First, money may be used to buy assets, which is any store of value (including money itself). 
Most assets are not counted as part of GDP because they are not newly produced goods or ser-
vices. For example, land is not produced, so money used to buy land or already existing build-
ings erected on that land, i.e., real estate, is not counted as part of GDP. A portion of such spend-
ing would count as GDP only if the buildings are newly erected, thus part of this year’s output. 
Money may be exchanged for financial instruments, such as stocks, bonds, derivatives, foreign 
currencies, etc., that have value but are not produced and therefore not part of GDP. Money may 
be exchanged for antiques, previously existing products like used cars or Picasso paintings. 
These things were counted as GDP in some past period, but when recirculated later at a price 
higher or lower than their original value are no longer counted in current GDP. So money is used 
as means of payment for many things that are not counted as part of GDP and therefore represent 
an unnoticed “leakage” from the fundamental monetary equation. The only way this leakage is 
noted at all is in the definitions of money, since corporate and rich people’s money is more likely 
to be spent on assets than ordinary people’s money, it is relegated to the more rarified species of 
money, M3 and above. However, this is a very indirect and inexact way of accounting for this 
difference by a “science” that prides itself on quantitative exactness. 
The second “leakage” of money not shown in M x V = P x Y is less significant, but none-
theless important to note. Money used as means of payment in intermediate transactions is not 
counted as part of GDP. For example, when a new car is sold, its price is included in GDP. But 
many transactions occurred in purchasing the inputs to construct that car, including the car com-
pany’s purchase of steel from a steel company, etc. All these intermediate transactions may be 
mediated by money, but that use of money is ignored in the fundamental equation. This could be 
significant, for instance, if companies become more vertically integrated and thus incorporate 
more of the production process within a single company. In that case, many intermediate transac-
tions disappear and become instead administrative transfers within the same company. This is 
increasingly relevant today as more than half of world trade occurs within divisions of the same 
company, thus bypassing the market system entirely. The demand for money would thereby de-
crease, but since the equation distracts attention from this leakage, the issue is most often ig-
nored. Of course, as we shall discuss in the next section, these sorts of transactions, like most 
business trades, are not in fact mediated by money, but by credit, which is why this leakage is 
not as significant as it otherwise might be. 
The third usage of money not shown in the formula but sometimes considered by econo-
mists is as a store of value. Remember this is one of the functions of money typically given. But 
what economists do not draw attention to is that this usage is an alternative to money’s usage as a 
means of exchange. If money is hoarded (Marx’s terminology) then it is not spent. The equation 
captures this indirectly, since hoarded money will show up as a reduced velocity of money. 
Keynes introduced money hoarding as “liquidity preference,” i.e., sometimes, particularly in 
times of crisis, people will hold onto more money than usual to meet the contingencies of the cri-
sis. Keynes and modern economists treat such hoarding as primarily a defensive impulse, driven 
 by fear of the sudden need for means of payment to meet such contingencies as the loss of a job 
or the inability to rollover a loan. But as we will see toward the end of this paper, the offensive 
uses of hoards are at least as important. Money hoards serve the same strategic purpose as re-
serves do in military strategy. Clausewitz and Sun Zi are at least as important in understanding 
their uses as are Keynes and Marx. 
Economists seldom grasp the strategic uses of money hoards. One of the clearest illustra-
tions of this was penned around the time of the Great Depression by prominent economist Jacob 
Viner: 
 
[Money] is a store of wealth. So we are told, without a smile on the face. But in the world 
of the classical economy, what an insane use to which to put it! For it is a recognized 
characteristic of money as a store of wealth that it is barren; whereas practically every 
other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit. Why should anyone outside a 
lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of wealth? (Minsky 1977: 77) 
 
Viner is correct. In the perfect equilibrium world of the classical (what we now call neoclassical) 
economy, money as a store of wealth would be nonsensical, but that imaginary world does not 
exist. In the real world, cash reserves are often a vital strategic resource. It is no wonder that neo-
classicals like Viner and his equally famous contemporary, Irving Fisher, both lost significant 
wealth during the Great Crash of 1929, whereas Keynes, preserving liquidity then using short 
strategies, added to his. The neoclassical view is the suckers’ play, though I hesitate to be as im-
polite as Viner and call it “lunatic.” 
The importance of money hoarding shows the uselessness of the fundamental equation. If 
the supply of money increases, this may be a sign of increased purchasing power and therefore of 
growing GDP (for Keynesians) or increased inflation (for monetarists) or it might just be a sign 
that money is being hoarded because of a dire economic crisis. The fundamental equation of 
money cannot distinguish the difference, at least not a priori. In fact, the U.S. money supply in-
creased during the early years of the Great Depression in both nominal and especially real terms 
(since deflation meant money’s value was increasing). In such circumstances, monetarists have it 
backwards. Instead of the increase of the money supply signaling increased purchasing power 
and thus inflation, it portended a collapse of demand and hoarding of means of payment as a 
store of value instead. This is also why the massive quantitative easing (QE) policies worldwide 
after 2008 did not cause the inflation that monetarists crowed about. 
Instead, when banks were bailed out in the aftermath of the 2008 crises, they held most of 
their newly acquired taxpayer cash as excess reserves, preferring to secure their own solvency at 
the expense of debtors who could no longer borrow. Likewise, many non-financial corporations 
hoarded cash in the aftermath of the crisis rather than hire or expand their physical investments. 
They wagered that if they could not count on credit from banks, they needed more cash to secure 
themselves in a risky economy. Therefore, despite the enormous largesse to the banks, extensive 
hoarding of money meant that the velocity of M1 fell to the lowest level in history, less than one. 
Previously “normal” levels were about five. Rather than inflation, the problem became deflation. 
As always, it was tightening private credit that caused deflation, not the less significant move-
ments of the money supply. 
 Economists’ treatment of money is so jumbled and imprecise because they are deter-
mined to apply to money their one and only tool of analysis. Economics is the study of choice 
under a constraint. So economists always must define a constraint, in this case, the fixed supply 
of money, and a choice, for monetary economics, it is the choice between spending and saving. 
This is the only method they know, so it is absolutely necessary to define money in a way that 
makes it a definite scarce quantity of something. In former times, it was a scarce quantity of spe-
cie. Even Marx was misled by this view. Nowadays, it is a scarce quantity of something presum-
ably “controlled” or at least influenced by each nation’s central bank. 
This is far too narrow a view. In fact, the value of money itself is determined not by the 
supply of gold or what the Fed does, at least not solely. The value of money is not determined, as 
supposedly everything is in economics, by the supply and demand for itself, however this dispar-
ate artifact is defined. The value of money is determined by the expansion and contraction of 
credit. Throughout history, even in most socialist countries, the supply of credit is primarily a 
private power. Government regulation may channel and constrain this power, but unless credit is 
a public monopoly, which it is not even in most socialist countries, then the value of money is 
determined collectively by the sum of all credit decisions made by all potential creditors in the 
society. Money itself is merely one form of circulating credit, but it is the totality of credit in re-
lation to the real productive capacity of the economy and the strategic decisions of capitalists that 
determines money’s value. Thus we study credit directly, as economics seldom does, in the next 
section. 
 
What is Credit? 
 
The word ‘credit’ derives from the Latin verb for trust, credere. Whereas the quintessen-
tial economic transaction is an exchange of value for equal value in a different form, the quintes-
sential credit transaction is the exchange of value for a promise of returning an equivalent or en-
hanced value in the future. Historically, credit predates money and does not require it. Therefore, 
economists who define interest as “the time value of money” are anachronistic. A credit transac-
tion is a fundamentally different transaction than an economic exchange of equal values. 
An exchange occurs at a point in time and terminates immediately. It does not take place 
across extended time. It does not necessarily entangle the two parties to the exchange in an ongo-
ing relationship. The most common form of exchange is a purchase-and-sale. Another form, bar-
ter, is largely mythic outside of economics textbooks, wherein is it often assumed to prevail in 
order to avoid considering the effects of money and credit. 
A credit transaction necessarily entangles the creditor and debtor in an ongoing relation-
ship that extends across time. For the duration of this relationship, the interests of the creditor 
and debtor are opposed. James Madison,3 probably the foremost political theorist among the 
American presidents, lists creditor and debtor second (after the propertied and propertyless) 
among the opposing factions that necessarily strive for opposite political policies, validating his 
constitutional design of checks and balances. Indeed it is the credit relationship that necessarily 
constitutes capitalism as a two-party system and that animates the business cycle. If anything, it 
                                                 
3 Federalist Papers, No. 10, p. 1 
 is the most fundamental economic transaction, yet it is profoundly neglected by economics, 
which prefers to recast every transaction as an economic exchange of value for value. 
The expansion of credit, even in its most primitive forms, is bullish. Thus the expansion 
and contraction of credit is directly related to the business cycle, which is sometimes (I think too 
narrowly) referred to as the credit cycle. Capitalism, constituted as a system with opposing credit 
interests, necessarily has a business cycle. Political regulation can channel and influence this 
competition, but cannot eliminate it. Therefore, Keynesians are wrong to believe that Keynes’ 
discoveries allow the business cycle to be tamed or managed adequately. We will explore this 
point in more detail below. 
Economics likes to begin with fables. So consider a realistic fable about credit in prehis-
toric times. One farmer possesses an ox. Another does not. If a neighbor lends his ox when it 
would otherwise be idly grazing so that his neighbor can better till her fields, total output will ex-
pand. More will be produced using exactly the same economic inputs because idle capabilities 
are engaged by this extension of credit, in the form of an ox, from one farmer to another. When 
the ox is returned to its owner, the transaction is complete. Whether or not some interest payment 
is included is incidental to defining this as a credit relationship. 
Consider the next credit relationship that emerges in prehistory, generating the first capi-
talists. One farmer is particularly successful for whatever reason, growing considerably more 
grain than her family can consume. The myth of exchange says that this farmer will exchange 
her excess grain for other things she lacks. But what if all her neighbors are also grain farmers? 
At harvest time, grain is plentiful and nobody wants the farmer’ excess. So instead she stores it 
in earthen jars. (Recall the Biblical fable of seven fat years and seven lean years.4) Months later, 
deep in the winter, some of the other farmers have consumed most of their grain, even the seed 
they had saved for next year’s planting. Perhaps some was consumed by rats. Now the farmers 
who have depleted their grain are desperate. They may beg the prosperous farmer for a share of 
her excess grain. If she gives freely, it is altruism. If she cuts a deal, she becomes the first capi-
talist and a creditor. The deal is this: “I will give you one bag of grain now, but when you harvest 
in the fall, you must return back to me two bags.” I am not making this up. This is the exact deal 
that was still common in the rural Philippines when I visited during the 1980s. If the debtor’s 
next harvest is also inadequate, and the creditor has sufficient authority or force of arms, debt 
slavery for oneself or one’s dependents is the next step. This is a fable, but undoubtedly close to 
the prehistoric truth about birth of economic classes. 
The next credit relationship is the first that makes its mark on written history: the temple 
as creditor. The most successful farmer-creditors accumulate so much surplus grain that they 
must build large structures to contain and defend it. They brag to their neighbors that they have 
so much because the gods (or perhaps one specific god) have favored them. Furthermore, anyone 
who displeases them or offends their god will suffer. In fact, the poverty of others is the very 
mark of their inequity and the lack of favor shown to them by the gods. However, they might im-
prove their station by donating the first fruits of their animals and harvests to the god. The former 
                                                 
4 Genesis 41:26-27 
 farmer-creditors, who have set themselves up as priests, no longer need to work the land them-
selves. They can live entirely off the donations of others, and support armed retainers as well. 
Beyond that, their additional surplus goods are lent at interest.  
We know this because many of the earliest cuneiform documents are actually debt con-
tracts, specified not in money (which did not yet exist), but in kind. The debtors are various. The 
creditors are most often a god, represented of course by his/her local priestly intercessor. Interest 
was paid in kind. Default incurs penalties both practical, debt slavery, and supernatural, a divine 
curse (Homer and Sylla 2005: 3-6, 17-35). This is the origin of both banking and institutional-
ized religion. As others have observed, an architectural shadow of this origin remained into the 
twentieth century insofar as the preferred structure for a bank imitated the classical temple. 
All these early forms of credit were bilateral relationships between a creditor and a 
debtor. The next great innovation in credit, whose appearance seems likely to have been coinci-
dent with seaborne trade, was the development of instruments of circulating credit, including 
both money and bills of exchange. A confusion has long existed about money, because many of 
its early forms had intrinsic value as precious metals, that money must have intrinsic value to 
function as such. As I said, even advanced social thinkers, including Marx, entertained this illu-
sion. However, considering money and bills of exchange together, we can see that even at its 
origin, money need not have intrinsic value identical to its face value, because it also functions as 
circulating credit. Bills of exchange, a purer form of circulating credit, illustrate this more di-
rectly. 
Even though coined money most likely predates bills of exchange, I treat bills first be-
cause they are a purer form of circulating credit. Once you understand bills, then coins and paper 
money are easier to understand correctly. Whereas bilateral credit effects only two parties di-
rectly, circulating credit may act as a medium of exchange and thus facilitate a number of suc-
cessive transactions. Like all credit, bills depend on trust. They will circulate only if the promise 
of the original issuer to pay the face value is trusted. A bill is a promise to pay a specified 
amount, the face value, in the future, often on a specified day known as the maturity date. The 
issuer could be anyone, but most often it is a well-known merchant or banker considered credit-
worthy within at least commercial circles. Bills are typically discounted, that is, they are ac-
cepted at a value slightly below their face value until their maturity date, when they may be re-
deemed by the issuer for their full value. 
Circulating credit instruments are called by many different names, but for simplicity they 
can be grouped into just a few categories: bills, bonds and currency. Paper currency may also be 
referred to (as printed on the U.S. money) as notes. In addition to these three we will also con-
sider loans, which are usually considered bilateral rather than circulating credit, but this is not 
always the case, as we shall see. 
For purposes of our discussion, bills are any negotiable instrument that does not pay ex-
plicit interest but does have an implicit yield because they typically trade at a discount prior to 
their fixed maturity date. What I call bills may be designated with that term or also called letters 
of credit, bankers’ acceptances, notes, commercial paper, short-term money, repurchase (repo) 
agreements, zero-coupon bonds, etc. All bills have a face value denominated in a currency and a 
maturity date at which that face value is due from the issuer. Their current market price is almost 
 always below the face value, reflecting an implicit interest rate between the present and the ma-
turity date, which is typically within one year or less.  
For hundreds of years bills have been a common means of payment in many mercantile 
and governmental transactions. The receiver of the bill then takes it to a discounter, usually a 
merchant or investment bank, who is confident of the credit-worthiness of the issuer and is thus 
willing to exchange cash for the bill or increment the sellers’ account. Very large bill dis-
counters, such as the Bank of England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or any 
large investment bank, process so many bills from so many issuers that they have a statistically 
significant sample of all extant credit. Nearly anyone can issue a bill as long as their credit is ad-
equate for their bills to be acceptable. However, if any one issuer seems to be issuing too many 
bills, large discounters who are accumulating their bills may reduce what they are willing to pay 
(increase the discount) or refuse to accept any more bills from that issuer. Thus the bill market is 
regulated not by governments, but by the collective willingness of discounters to buy bills.5 
Bonds are a class of circulating credit instruments that include debentures and annuities. 
They are similar to bills except that they pay interest and tend to have much longer lifespans. 
Their maturity is measured in years rather than days, weeks or months. Some bonds (actually, 
better termed annuities) are even perpetual. That is, unless they are repurchased by the issuer, 
they continue to pay interest indefinitely, some for centuries. Others are life annuities, paying in-
terest for the life of the owner. Most true bonds, however, have a fixed maturity date, like a bill, 
but the date might be 5, 10, 30 or even more years from the date of issue. The current owner of 
the bond receives the coupon rate, a fixed interest payment that is percentage of the face value of 
the bond. Underwriting bills and bonds on behalf of merchant, corporate, or governmental clients 
is the main business of investment or merchant banks.6 
Like bills, bonds may be traded from one owner to another, but that market price that 
may be higher or lower than their face value. The current price of a bond is often expressed as a 
percentage of its face value. For example, a $10,000 5% bond trading at 95 would sell for 
$9,500. Every year (often in two semi-annual installments) it pays $500 interest to the current 
owner. If 5% is a high interest rate at the moment, then the bond is more valuable, and will typi-
cally sell for a price above par, say $11,000. But if 5% currently is not a very attractive interest 
rate, the bond will sell at a discount, below par. Of course, the price of the bond will converge 
toward its face value as it nears maturity. Bonds and bills are discounted more whenever the risk 
of default increases. A sovereign borrower (a government) may default merely by refusing to 
honor the bond when it matures or by refusing to make the coupon payments. Since a bond is a 
legal contract, a private issuer can only default on payment by declaring bankruptcy, though 
sometimes settlements are reached by negotiation between debtor and creditor that reduce the 
amount paid out, but avoid complete default or bankruptcy. This is called renegotiating or re-
scheduling a debt. 
What most people call money I will hereafter refer to as currency, i.e., circulating coins 
and paper notes. Most people do not think about it, but these are also debts. Until the twentieth 
                                                 
5 Two of the most useful introductions to the bill market and its importance are Bagehot (2001[1878]) and Neal 
(1990), although Neal’s account suffers somewhat from his efforts to shoehorn the evidence into the defective idiom 
of modern finance theory. 
6 A useful though anecdotal introduction to bonds and other financial instruments is Ferguson (2008). 
 century, notes were usually issued by certain private banks. Nowadays they are usually issued by 
a country’s government-controlled central bank, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve. Either way, 
they are a liability or debt of the bank of issue. The difference between currency and a bill is that 
currency is intended to trade at its face value. It has no maturity date. It is payable at face value 
on demand. One disadvantage relative to a bill or bond is that it pays no interest. Currencies 
trade at a discount to their face value only when the solvency of their issuer is in question, as for 
example happened to Confederate dollars during the later part of the American civil war. Cur-
rency has another significant disadvantage: it is easily stolen. Since bills are only traded and dis-
counted within business circles wherein participants are usually mutual acquaintances, a stolen 
bill is much harder to use as means of payment than is the more anonymous currency.  
Currencies are strong or weak not according to the wealth of the countries wherein they 
are legal tender, but according to the resources of the issuing bank. For example, Russia until 
World War I was a large, fast-growing power, but its currency was fairly weak because its bank-
ing and financial system were underdeveloped. Tiny Belgium had a stronger currency because of 
its very well developed financial system and secure bank of issue, backed by the House of Roth-
schild.7 Thus Belgian banks and investors habitually lent capital to Russia. Countries that export 
capital generally have strong currencies, but even net capital importers, like the U.S. today, may 
have strong currencies if they have well developed financial systems attractive to foreign inves-
tors. Prosperous financial systems, not strong governments, make currencies strong. 
There is a fourth form of credit that often becomes circulating credit, but is not tradition-
ally associated with the other forms. Bank loans and deposits are the quintessential banking ac-
tivity described, in stylized fashion, in economic textbooks, particularly money and banking 
texts. I prefer to think of deposits in the same way as banks treat them in their own accounting. 
When you deposit your money in a bank, you are actually loaning the bank your money. They 
may pay you interest on this loan. Meanwhile, they will take the capital you loan to them and 
loan it out again at a higher rate of interest to other clients, making a profit on the interest spread. 
At first glance, such deposits-and-loans appear to be a form of bilateral credit. Sometimes they 
are. More often these funds will circulate, as when your bank deposit is in a checking account, 
which you use as means of payment, essentially transferring the funds owed to you by the bank 
to some other party. 
Money and banking textbooks treat deposits as the prerequisite of loans, but actually, 
broadly speaking, the two are independent of each other. Credit can be created from nothing. All 
it requires is trust. A bank’s sources of capital are various, and may include but do not require 
deposits. A bank’s uses of capital are also various. They may include but do not require loans. 
The specific sources and uses of financial capital vary among banks and through history. But 
credit may be created easily from nothing. A bank may loan a client $10 million merely by 
changing his account balance in its ledger. The accounting is consistent, because the debtor’s 
new deposit is the bank’s liability and the loan is its interest-paying asset. Whether or not a bank 
or other creditor maintains reserves against any loan is a secondary question. 
 
 
                                                 
7 An indispensable introduction to Rothschild financial operations is Ferguson (1998) and (1999). 
  
Loans may also be sold to third parties. During recent decades this has become routine. 
For example, the bank that originated my home mortgage soon sold it to another. It was trans-
ferred several times since. Like most loans today, it has become circulating credit. Loans are of-
ten combined together into pools owned by special purpose corporations that use this pool of 
loans as collateral issuing and funding bonds, called collateralized debt obligations (CDO). This 
process is called securitization. Such instruments were at the heart of the 2008 world financial 
crisis. Loans, bonds, and financial derivatives are all linked together. They must be understood as 
elements of a comprehensive credit system. 
The totality of credit, including both bilateral and circulating credit, is issued at the initia-
tive of myriad debtors without any central coordination or control. Therefore it is impossible for 
the total quantity of net new credit to exactly maintain a constant value of money. If credit is is-
sued faster than the growth of the stock of goods and assets purchased with it, then some prices 
must inflate as too much buying power chases too few assets. This may seem an echo of the text-
book explanation of inflation, but my account is much broader because I recognize that the 
credit-creation process is anarchic and that new credit can be spent on GDP or on existing assets. 
Economic textbooks try to tidy up this inherent anarchy by making money (merely one form of 
circulating credit) the means of payment, whereas I recognize that bills and other forms of credit 
are common means of payment for both GDP and assets. 
Furthermore, textbooks treat money as something scarce, in fixed supply, whereas credit 
is expandable almost at whim. The only limit to the expansion of credit is the willingness of 
creditors to issue it and debtors to demand it. This limit is explored in more detail in the final 
section of this paper. Finally, as mentioned above, textbook economics teaches that the supply 
and demand for money determines its value, whereas I contend that the supply of credit in rela-
tion to the pool of tradable goods and assets determines the value of money. Excessive use of 
credit causes inflation, including asset price bubbles. Excessive curtailment of credit causes de-
flation, including asset market crashes. What economists refer to as money in measures like M1 
and M2 is not typically the most volatile part of credit. Rather, it is the unregulated private issu-
ance of credit in the form of bills etc. that most animates the business cycle. Prices boom when 
credit is easy and crash when it is tightened. 
Capitalist power includes owning the means of production, but is not confined to that. 
Perhaps the foremost strategic power within capitalism is the power to advance or deny credit. 
Credit starts with bilateral credit, which remains significant today in most business transactions, 
since customers often receive credit from the buyer as an account payable, to be settled later. 
Few legal transactions require immediate cash payment, except during times of crisis. But it is 
only when circulating credit becomes the predominant form, with the proliferation of bills, 
bonds, currency, and circulating loans, that finance capital comes of age. Circulating credit facil-
itates the centralization of finance capital to an unprecedented degree from the Renaissance to 
the present. 
 
 
 
 
 What Is Capital? 
 
Capital is wealth seeking augmentation. Not all wealth is capital, because some wealth, 
for example, a mansion that is the residence of its owner, is for enjoyment or display and thus is 
not owned primarily as an investment seeking augmentation. Forms of capital include wealth in-
vested in financial assets, real estate not for personal use, productive assets, or merely liquid 
funds awaiting deployment. Some wealth normally not considered capital may function as such 
if the owner needs reserve funds, e.g., selling the family jewels. 
Capital increases in two ways: by the increase in its own sale value, which is called capi-
tal gain, and by the income it may generate, including rent from real estate, profit from business 
ventures, dividends from stocks, and interest earned from loans or interest-bearing securities 
such as bonds. The total rate of expansion of capital is the sum of these two sources of growth. 
This rate can be negative if the market value falls by a percentage greater than the rate of income 
earned. Until an asset is actually sold, capital gains are called “paper profits/losses” because they 
are only theoretical. Only when an asset is finally sold are any capital gains realized or losses 
locked in. 
Economists claim that returns to capital are justified by the value that capital contributes 
to the productive process. This is part of a theory of distribution known as the marginal product 
theory. Prior to the later nineteenth century, this view was not widespread. Classical political 
economy from Adam Smith through Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill viewed the social distribu-
tion of output among classes as resulting from both economic processes and political struggle 
among economic classes. Only with the rise of neoclassical economics since the 1870s has this 
distribution of income been considered almost entirely an economic process. I adhere more to the 
classical view. 
Classical political economists did not believe in the marginal product theory. David Ri-
cardo, for example, and neo-Ricardians since, argue that most often labor and capital are applied 
to production in relatively fixed “doses.” If capital cannot be increased without increasing labor 
commensurately, then it is meaningless to try to define the specific contribution of capital (or la-
bor) separately. For example, in sewing factory, each worker tends one and only one sewing ma-
chine. Adding a sewing machine without adding a worker to operate it is nonsensical. Yet neo-
classical economic relies on defining the marginal productivity of capital as if capital can be 
added and its unique productivity measured without any change in the number of workers or the 
technology. There are some circumstances where this is possible, but many where it is not. As a 
general theory of income paid to the owners of capital, it fails. 
There are other powerful logical and empirical reasons for rejecting the marginal product 
theory of distribution, but reviewing them all would be a distraction from my purpose here. Suf-
fice to say I agree with the classical view that capital receives whatever income it does for vari-
ous reasons, including economic causes, relative power, and, not the least, various random or 
serendipitous reasons. Unlike neoclassical economists, I do not believe that any particular distri-
bution of profits reflects either justice or efficiency. 
Unfortunately, despite the importance of our topic, capital, I know of no general work 
that treats it comprehensively. Marx wrote an important three-volume work entitled Capital, but 
 this work starts not with capital, but with commodities and then commodity money. It never de-
velops an adequate theory of capital itself, since Marx, like the neoclassicals, neglects credit, per-
haps the most important source of capital. This is understandable, since his real topic is not capi-
tal per se, but the source and distribution of surplus value generated by capital. His purpose is to 
demonstrate that the exploitation of labor is the ultimate source of all capital. One can agree with 
that and still understand that the proximate source of capital for most capitalists (other than their 
own or inherited wealth) is credit. Marx also claims he is interested in discerning the laws of mo-
tion of capitalism, but his unfinished inquiry foundered on his inattention to credit and its effect 
on both the business cycle and the value of money. Few Marxists have progressed much beyond 
where he left off. 
Modern Marxist treatments do sometimes treat credit and parts of the financial system,8 
but most who do so either treat them formally, using a mechanical or structural method much 
like that of mainstream economics, or anecdotally, without systematically treating the main 
methods and strategies of finance capital, as I do here briefly and in more detail in my book 
(Nolt 2015). The focus of my criticism here, however, is on the mainstream theory rather than a 
comprehensive survey and critique of Marxist treatments of money, credit and capital. Yet I have 
not found any that explain the strategic intent of financial interests adequately nor treat the real 
instrumentalities of power within finance. 
Capital expands for two reasons: increases in the social surplus and increases in credit. 
Marx focused on the former and neglected the latter. Social surplus expands, he contended, be-
cause the exploitation of labor creates surplus for the capitalists. The higher the rate of surplus, 
the more capital is created. The more labor that is incorporated into capitalist relations of produc-
tion, the more capital is created. Thus increasing either the quantity of wage-labor employed or 
the rate of exploitation increases capital. Thus Marx saw the accumulation of capital as being 
very close to the process of production. 
Ultimately, Marx is correct. Total social output and accumulated wealth do limit, in a 
very physical sense, what can be appropriated in total. But within these physical limits the quan-
tity of capital commanded by any particular capitalist individual or firm depends less on the spe-
cifics of production than on the relations of credit.  
An interesting example is one of the most successful stock traders of the first half of the 
twentieth century, Jesse Livermore. He was born into a modest farm family, but had a knack for 
stock trading. He started out in bucket shops, essentially mere gambling houses that wagered on 
stock prices, but was so successful that he kept getting kicked out of successive shops for win-
ning too consistently. Eventually he accumulated a big enough stake to trade on Wall Street, 
winning his first million by the 1890s. He was especially successful at profiting from short posi-
tions, betting when stocks would fall. He made a fortune both during the Panic of 1907 and the 
Great Crash of 1929. Livermore never produced any real social product, but he made five for-
tunes and lost four. Every time he went bankrupt he was able to get back in the game because 
friends who trusted in his ability were willing to advance him the credit to start again (Smitten 
2009). It is not necessary to produce or extract surplus value to have capital. All you need is 
credit. 
                                                 
8 E.g., Foley (1986), Kotz (2015), Kotz et al. (2010), McDonough et al. (2010). 
 Marx marveled at the prodigious success of industrial capitalism in accumulating capital 
through three means: expanding the wage labor system globally at the expense of peasant agri-
culture, increasing the efficiency of production by scientific means, and increasing the exploita-
tion of labor by lengthening the work day and cheapening the workers’ means of subsistence. 
These were indeed spectacular features of the nineteenth century. 
However the twentieth century marked a gradual transition from the predominance of in-
dustrial capital to finance capital. Make no mistake: industry is still vital to produce the physical 
social output. However, in all the wealthiest countries, industry is rapidly falling as the main em-
ployer of labor, even as a source of GDP. In the United Kingdom, for example, the birthplace of 
the industrial revolution, industry now accounts for less than one tenth of GDP. Even in low-
wage countries like China, many factories are highly automated, employing German-made com-
puter-controlled machinery and only a handful of productive workers. Entirely automated facto-
ries using industrial robots are not far off. In this “post-industrial” society, the physical means of 
production are even more alien to the vast majority of people than during Marx’s time when the 
tools of the artisan and peasant were being replaced by the machinery of the factory. 
The financialization of society is being further consolidated now, during the twenty-first 
century. Not only business transactions, but nearly all consumer transactions are mediated by 
credit, rather than the traditional money forms of cash or check. All trade is financed. All wars 
are financed. Even terrorists need financing. Nearly all distribution of income in the society de-
pends more on credit relations rather than on the direct relations of production Marx analyzed in 
Capital. Ignorance of credit guarantees ignorance of the real relations of social power. 
Credit itself is the main source of capital. Those who appropriate the greatest share of 
other people’s money are the biggest players. This idea is simple, but both neoclassical econo-
mists and their Marxist critics typically neglect focusing on the center of modern capitalism: the 
credit system. 
The credit system seems complex, but at the root it is simple. Understanding how capital 
is deployed strategically within a credit-driven system requires a working knowledge of the main 
financial instruments -- bills, bonds, currencies, loans, and derivatives -– and their strategic uses. 
Most importantly it requires an understanding of bulls, who use the leverage of credit to augment 
their capital by betting it on rising assets, including productive assets, and bears, who bet against 
the bulls. At its heart, financial capitalism must be a two party system, because every movement 
of asset values creates winners and losers. Prices rise, the bulls win. Prices fall, the bears win. 
This inherent simplicity is often obscured by the fact the any particular capitalist at any 
moment may be simultaneously taking bullish and bearish positions in various specific assets. 
However, the two-party nature of capitalism appears most sharply at moments of general crisis 
when many if not most assets are falling, in which case we may for a moment catch glimpses of 
the bear party, profiting from the losses of so many others. But even in “normal” times, the ever 
present struggle of bears and bulls churns prices endlessly, distributing losses and gains by the 
results of their strategic interactions, large and small. 
Capital is wealth seeking augmentation, either bullishly, by owning assets expected to ap-
preciate or generate income; or bearishly by owning liquid assets or short positions so as to capi-
talize on falling prices to buy at a discount and thereby profit. Most people easily imagine the 
bullish capitalist but seldom imagine how often bearish capitalists profit from others’ loss. 
 Capitalist Crises 
 
Capitalism has two varieties of crises: rampaging bulls and ravenous bears. A bullish cri-
sis occurs when credit is being issued in excess of the increase in social output so that the prices 
of some things must rise. Exactly which prices rise the most matters a lot for the dynamic of the 
crisis, but this is ignored in standard economic textbooks that treat the price level (like the money 
supply) as a single distinct thing measured by the consumer price index (CPI). Economists lose 
so much by obsessing on gray averages instead of appreciating the extremes of credit polariza-
tion. If credit expansion is particularly in the form of broker loans, a bubble in stocks results. If 
excessive credit is issued for real estate, housing bubbles occur. If excessive credit is extended to 
government, then prices of whatever government buys will inflate and bonds (the main form of 
government financing) will be depressed in value. The dynamic of every inflationary crisis de-
pends on the specifics of credit. 
A bearish crisis is the opposite. Credit is curtailed, leading to falling prices and failing 
businesses. The bears then buy the assets of others at a discount. Any significant restriction of 
credit, whether by public or private agency, is bound to cause a fall in the prices somewhere in 
the economy. As with an inflationary crisis, the devil is in the details. Whose credit is restricted 
matters a lot for the specific dynamics of each crisis. You can reverse whatever I said in the pre-
vious paragraph. If brokers’ loans are most curtailed, stock prices will plummet. If real estate 
lending is restricted, housing prices tumble. If government securities are hard to sell to investors, 
wars must end and governments cut back their employee rolls. If credit is tight for industrial 
companies, investment in new plant and equipment dries up. Do not pay attention only to the dull 
gray averages. Pay attention to the extremes of credit leverage and denial. 
Almost everything in taught in economics and everyday popular business culture runs 
contrary to seeing capitalism as a two-party system. Constant repetition of business news tells as 
when the economy is good and when it is bad. Economic textbooks teach that everyone benefits 
from a growing economy. Both are false. No state of the economy and no transition of the econ-
omy is good for everyone or bad for everyone. Most people who get rich quickly do so because 
they know how to profit from others’ loss, as Jesse Livermore did. Interests able to cause others 
to lose are in the greatest position of power. 
Interestingly, this is why labor unions were powerful, at least during the height of indus-
trialism. They were (and still are) most powerful in heavy industries where large quantities of 
physical capital require constant employment to service the debts undertaken to purchase long-
lasting capital equipment in such industries as railroads, shipping and ship-building, iron and 
steel, chemicals, and oil refining. If workers can organize a disciplined union, they can raise 
wages by threatening to strike, to stop the flow of production. Debt service must continue, but 
income stops. The capitalists who are most indebted, often those who procured the most long-
lasting physical capital, must surrender first. It pays for them to buy labor peace with higher 
wages rather than risk debt service without income. Conversely, in labor-intensive employments 
where less capital is committed per worker or committed for shorter times and thus less in need 
of long-term financing, unions are weaker. Even dynamics of everyday class struggle are not 
fully comprehensible without considering credit. 
 Banks and large financial institutions enjoy a particularly powerful strategic role in the 
economy because collectively they control the main sources of credit. Credit power is the power 
to advance or deny credit. Economists have created the myth that credit is allocated by markets. 
In fact, credit conditions are influenced by markets, especially the secondary asset markets for 
bonds and bills, but every individual credit decision is a moment of power for the potential credi-
tor. The decision to advance or deny credit is probably the greatest power in the world today, 
binding even governments. 
Economists claim the credit decision is market determined because, in their theory, any 
potential borrower refused by one creditor can get credit from any other if they are fundamen-
tally credit-worthy in the first place. If the credit business were like the restaurant business, per-
haps this would be true. For some small, retail-level loans, perhaps it still is. But the credit sys-
tem is a pyramid. At its top, where truly gargantuan deals are negotiated for issuing credit to 
governments and large corporations, credit allocation is by cartel, not by free market. These larg-
est deals also influence the decisions of so many lesser institutions that they can have a broad im-
pact on the direction of the economy as a whole. If credit is curtailed at the top, large institutions 
can fail, governments retrench, and bull markets crash. 
I have researched the activities of leading investment banks using the bankers own pa-
pers, including such famous institutions and families as J. P. Morgan & Company and the Rocke-
fellers. I have studied the research of others into major investment houses, such as Ferguson’s 
(1998 and 1999) useful investigation of the House of Rothschild and much more. I have also ex-
amined in detail the credit conditions and strategic actions of creditors during a number of major 
economic crises through history. Some of that research has been published; more will appear in 
my next book, Finance, including Private Power and Strategy. What I find in every crisis is that 
there is a moment, which Keynes calls a culminating point, when bears and bulls have built up 
opposing positions, often quite rapidly. One side or the other will profit quickly or lose big, like a 
decisive battle in war. At those moments, as in routine times when large loans are syndicated, the 
opposing parties are organized, and the generals of finance are typically identifiable strategists 
whose intent is comprehensible, whether they win, lose, or withdraw to fight again later. 
Routinely, large loans are nearly always syndicated. This has been true for centuries. 
Each syndicate typically has a lead bank that negotiates the terms of the loan with the debtor. 
Most often, large loans take the form of bond issues, though they may be structured in various 
ways. The lead bank also allocates shares of the loan among the syndicate of participating credi-
tors, much the way a cartel allocates production among its members to restrict output and raise 
prices. If the loan takes to form of a bond, typically the lead bank offers the issuer of the loan, 
the debtor, a percentage of the face value of the bonds that is often in the 90s, say 92. The lead 
bank then offers the other syndicate portions of the loan at a higher price, perhaps 93. This gives 
the lead bank a 1% profit on the entire loan amount. The syndicate members then call their most 
favored clients, either rich investors, institutions or brokers, offering shares of their share at a 
higher price, say 94, yielding a 1% profit to every syndicate member (and an additional 1% to 
the lead bank on its retained share). After this initial allocation is made, the initial public offering 
(IPO) to the public begins. Only at this moment do markets start to function, as brokers and other 
initial recipients of the bond offer some or all of their share on public markets. If the lead bank 
did its job correctly, the bond is initially a little bit underpriced, so that the price jumps up during 
 the initial hours of public trading, let’s say above 95. If the issue is successful (most are), all the 
bonds are sold at a profit and the syndicate members and their initial clients make a quick and 
reliable return. Financial systems routinely reward all inside players with rich and reliable prof-
its. 
Economists will object that if this were true competition would soon bid down the fees 
earned at each step of the IPO, because others could offer this same service for less and thus take 
business from the greedy cartel, or, as it was called in the Progressive Era, the Money Trust. The 
reason this rarely happens with the largest loans is that there are very few banks that have the ca-
pability of floating large issues. Often most or all of those competent to participate are invited 
into the syndicate by the lead bank, in which case there is nobody on the outside to turn to. New 
banks cannot just form willy nilly and offer to compete in the same business, because starting 
from nothing they lack the trust of a large network of brokers, dealers, investors, and corporate 
clients to gain the confident of a potential issuer. Furthermore, if a prominent lead bank rejects a 
potential debtor as too risky, or offers them a low price for their bonds (thus a high interest rate), 
outsiders might be reticent to take the business, even if their judgment of this potential borrower 
is not as harsh as the lead bank. Lead banks have credibility in financial circles. If they say no to 
a loan and somebody else takes it up, lead banks have every incentive to prove they were right to 
refuse it. Proving that includes dissuading their own clients from buying it and releasing negative 
news about it to the press. These are not just suppositions on my part. I have seen evidence like 
this in archives. 
For example, if a large European country, say Austria-Hungary or Italy, wanted to float a 
loan during the nineteenth century, and it was turned down by the House of Rothschild, the lead-
ing bank of that time (actually a network of family banks), the country might approach another 
bank, but that bank would immediately ask why the Rothschilds bowed out, and scrutinize the 
borrower very closely. If the loan is issued, it would be at a considerably higher interest rate. Al-
most by definition, any business that is good business goes to the top bank first. If it is refused by 
them, it is for that reason alone seen as inferior. The credit system is a pyramid. 
On the other hand, I have emphasized that capitalism is a two-party system, so how can 
credit be organized only into a single cartel? Often there is a dominant set of banks, who work 
together in syndicates, and also rival groups expanding credit more aggressively and lending to 
riskier customers turned down by the biggest banks. In other words, finance often polarizes into 
bears at the top and aspiring bulls just beneath them. During growth times, these bulls might ride 
a wave, financing risky new industries, bullish fast-growing companies, and aggressive investors 
piling into bull markets. Often such bulls profit conspicuously, until the inevitable credit-tighten-
ing and crash. I have not the time or space here, but prior to almost any major crisis in history, I 
can provide at least an initial sketch of who were the bears and bulls and how they staked their 
fortunes. 
I briefly mention four examples, one from each recent century, to hint how this sort of 
analysis proceeds. The greatest crash of the eighteenth century was the collapse of the Missis-
sippi bubble in France and soon thereafter, the South Sea Bubble in Britain. John Law in France 
and John Blunt and other British projectors who promoted the South Sea Company were the 
leading bulls. The Bank of England and a group of Amsterdam financiers were the leading bears. 
The worldwide Panic of 1873 began as the Rothschilds financed the replacement of the silver 
 standard in Germany, France, Italy and several other countries with a more bearish gold stand-
ard. This was also the single most profitable year for the Rothschild banks. Many other financi-
ers, farmers and industrialists favored the more bullish silver standard (officially, bimetallism). 
This issue was also at the forefront of American politics for most of the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century. During the Panic of 1907 the bulls were financed by the new, less regulated trust 
companies, whereas the bears, led by J.P. Morgan, eventually clipped their wings and decided 
which to save with new injections of credit and which to abandon to bankruptcy. As the financial 
crisis of 2008 approached, most of the large investment banks were bullish on securitizing hous-
ing loans, but J.P. Morgan held back. When Goldman Sachs joined it in the bear camp, the tide 
turned and many of the bulls were effectively bankrupt, although the government saved some. 
Each of these deserves, of course, very extensive analysis, but the method I outline here illumi-
nates them all. Both camps are organized and act strategically. 
Capitalism must necessarily have a business cycle because the temptations of leveraged 
growth are too great. There will always be capitalists eager and willing to borrow at 4% to earn 
5% in whatever venture. As long as such returns are possible, the greater the leverage, the greater 
the profit. But debt creates vulnerability as well as opportunity. The higher the leverage, the 
more likely a position will fail when credit conditions tighten, interest rates rise and it might no 
longer be possible to rollover loans that once seemed routine. Many bulls are bankrupted in each 
bearish crisis and often taken over by their bullish rivals who have maintained liquid reserves 
while the bulls borrowed heavily. Most dangerous for the bulls, it is often the creditors at the top 
of the system who first turn bearish, in their own interest, to prevent inflation from undermining 
the value of their financial assets denominated in fixed money terms, such as bonds, mortgages 
and currency. Bulls and debtors prosper from inflation. Bears and creditors do not. Because 
every capitalist system constitutes powerful bear and bull interests at the heart of the credit sys-
tem, strategic competition will necessarily create a business cycle. The more extreme the debt 
leverage, the greater the crisis potential. In the long run, the only equilibrium of sorts is the ever-
shifting balance of power between opposing interests. The capitalist antidote to a frenzy of bull-
ish greed is a cabal of bearish greed. 
As important as the expansion and contraction of credit is for capital formation and eco-
nomic dynamics, the impact of credit is still constrained by real social production. Credit does 
not directly produce anything, though sometimes it is useful to mobilize otherwise idle resources, 
beginning with my first example of the ox. But no matter how much credit is created, there is 
only so much total output to distribute. Financial assets, being paper claims, can be multiplied 
rather profligately, but for their value not to collapse, their owners must gain more and more real 
share of society’s output as income on these paper assets. Thus the share of output available for 
non-owners, including workers and the middle class, must diminish to sustain an asset boom. In-
flation of consumer prices faster than wages and salaries is one way to suppress demand from or-
dinary consumers to enable wealthy investors to claim more and more. Sometimes people do not 
see their own income falling, since it may be disguised by small wage increases for seniority, but 
newly hired employees may net less and less real income. Since redistribution of income today 
often occurs via the price and credit system rather than directly at the workplace (except in crises 
situations, like Greece), many people are unaware how differential price inflation and the diver-
sion of capital into financial speculation may actually make them poorer. Though of course, 
 many do suspect that the ballooning wealth of the top one percent is at their expense, they might 
not understand the mechanisms of redistribution. 
Neoclassical economics starts its analysis with consumer choice, also known as consumer 
sovereignty. Thus it seems that the economy exists solely to satisfy consumer desires. Actually, 
consumer power is largely inert and entirely nonstrategic. The real sovereign power in a capital-
ist system lies with the capitalists, especially nowadays the finance capitalists who are the princi-
pal purveyors of credit. Their decisions decisively influence the direction of new investment and 
price levels. However, no one capitalist clique manages the entire system, nor does the state. In-
stead, such a credit-driven system guarantees that contending forces must exist, often polarizing, 
especially at culminating points when the business cycle is poised to change directions. The stra-
tegic interaction of contending capitalist blocs determines not only average consumer prices, but 
also the prices of assets, whether they bubble upward or crash. The effects of interacting forces 
are complex, typically covert, but not indecipherable. One must only start to look. 
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